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Effects of Information Content and Evaluative Extremity
on Positivity and Negativity Biases
Bogdan Wojciszke, Hanna Brycz, and Peter Borkenau
This article extends models that assume that the integration of mixed (positive and negative) infor-
mation results in a negativity bias in the morality domain but a positivity bias in the competence
domain. Using functional analysis, this study predicted a positivity bias for moderately evaluated
information and a negativity bias for extremely evaluated information. Content domain (compe-
tence vs. morality) and evaluative extremity produced main effects in a 2 x 2 experiment where 108
Ss were provided with descriptions of negative and positive behaviors of fictitious targets. As
expected, the negativity effect in the morality domain was strong for extremely evaluated informa-
tion but weak or nonexistent for moderately evaluated information. In contrast, the positivity effect
in the competence domain was stronger for moderately than for extremely evaluated information.
We suggest that positive and negative evaluations serve as approach and avoidance cues in interper-
sonal perception.
The border between good and evil is located within rather
than between persons: Usually, the same person shows both
positive and negative attributes. An exception may be charac-
ters in the trivial literature, but this literature is considered
trivial exactly because it is populated with "black" and "white"
characters. According to the well-known averaging model of
information integration (N. H. Anderson, 1981), observers' im-
pressions of a person should be neutral if this person shows the
same number of positive and negative attributes, each to the
same extent.
Numerous studies reveal, however, that even if the relative
number of positive and negative attributes is controlled and
balanced, negative impressions tend to emerge (e.g., Birnbaum,
1973; Fiske, 1980; Oden & Anderson, 1971; Reeder & Coovert,
1986; Reeder & Spores, 1983; Roskey & Birnbaum, 1974; Van
der Pligt & Eiser, 1980; Warr, 1974). This suggests that negative
information, even if equal in extremity to positive information,
is given more weight in information integration, thus yielding a
negativity effect. This effect has been explained in terms of the
relative novelty of negative information (Fiske, 1980), its lower
ambiguity (Birnbaum, 1972; Wyer, 1973), or its greater discrep-
ancy with the general positivity of the typical or average person
(Simpson & Ostrom, 1976). According to Skowronski and Carl-
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ston (1989), each of these explanations is either logically flawed
or lacks direct evidence in support of crucial mediators. More-
over, none of them can explain positivity effects. Yet positivity
effects have also been found (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987),
although considerably less frequently than negativity effects.
Moral i ty-Competence Differences
Two theories, the schematic model of dispositional attribu-
tion (Reeder & Brewer, 1979) and the cue-diagnosticity model
of impression formation (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987), as-
sume that negativity effects occur if the integrated information
refers to morality, whereas positivity effects occur if the infor-
mation refers to competence-related qualities of the target. This
difference is due to opposite asymmetries in the diagnosticity
of positive and negative behaviors in the two content domains.
For moral traits, negative (e.g., dishonest) behaviors are pre-
sumed to be more informative than positive (e.g., honest) ones
because negative behaviors are perceived to be characteristic of
immoral persons only, whereas positive behaviors are perceived
to be performed by both moral and immoral persons. This
results in a stronger impact of negative behaviors on impres-
sions concerning morality, yielding a negativity effect in the
morality domain.
In contrast, the opposite asymmetry is presumed for compe-
tence-related traits, because competent performances occur
only among highly competent persons, whereas even highly
competent persons may sometimes fail because of obstacles,
fatigue, or lack of motivation. In the competence domain, posi-
tive behaviors are therefore more diagnostic than negative ones,
resulting in a positivity of impressions concerning competence.
This predicted positivity effect was obtained in one well-con-
trolled study by Skowronski and Carlston (1987, Experiment
2), and is also suggested by attributional findings reported by
Reeder and his colleagues (Reeder & Fulks, 1980; Reeder, Hen-
derson & Sullivan, 1982; Reeder, Messick, & Van Avermaet,
1977).
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Differences in diagnosticity, however, cannot account for all
findings in the information integration literature. Whereas the
negativity effect has been shown in a great number of studies,
the positivity effect seems to be very rare. Although some of the
earlier studies requested the integration of morality-related in-
formation (e.g., Birnbaum's or Reeder's research), and their ef-
fects can therefore be explained in terms of Reeder's or
Skowronski and Carlston's theories, numerous other studies
used input materials that are nonclassifiable or mixed concern-
ing the morality-competence distinction (e.g., Fiske, 1980;
Hodges, 1974; Ronis & Lipinski, 1985; Wyer, 1973). The sheer
number of studies that has demonstrated negativity effects sug-
gests that other factors probably account for this effect in addi-
tion to, or in combination with, the different diagnosticity of
positive and negative behaviors in the morality and competence
domain. We assume that the evaluative extremity of integrated
information is such a factor.
Evaluative Extremity of Integrated Information
The differentiation of behavioral information in terms of
morality and competence relatedness refers to its descriptive
meaning: Which traits, goals, or other qualities of actors does
the information indicate? But behavioral information also has
an evaluative meaning referring to observers' subjective re-
sponses toward the targets (are they good or bad, friendly or
dangerous, or should they be approached or avoided?). On the
basis of an extensive series of studies, Srull and Wyer (1989)
postulated that the descriptive and evaluative meanings of be-
havioral information are stored separately and processed in dif-
ferent ways. Moreover, their processing serves different func-
tions: The descriptive meaning is processed to categorize peo-
ple and to accurately infer their traits and intentions. In
contrast, the evaluative meaning is processed to direct the per-
ceiver's responses concerning approach or avoidance of the tar-
get person.
Clearly, the two meanings are related and interdependent.
For instance, the subject's approach or avoidance is influenced
by the characteristics attributed to the target. Yet, to consider
the positive or negative evaluation of behaviors as approach or
avoidance cues (Peeters, 1971) results in predictions that do not
directly follow from their status as descriptive cues. In particu-
lar, we hypothesize that perceivers avoid targets who produce
both extremely positive and extremely negative behaviors,
whereas they approach targets who produce moderately posi-
tive and negative behaviors. Moreover, we expect that this effect
is independent of the specific content of the behaviors.
We assume that negativity effects reflect a risk-avoidance
strategy in interpersonal relations. Negative responses toward
persons result in avoidance of any further contacts with them in
order to avoid the anticipated harmful outcomes of those con-
tacts. In effect, any possible beneficial outcomes of these con-
tacts are lost as well, which is the price for safety. Such a risk-
avoidance strategy seems to be most appropriate if the poten-
tially harmful consequences of the actions of persons are
severe, as the harm caused by them is likely to be irreversible
(Kanouse & Hanson, 1971). Thus, we expect a tendency toward
negativity if there is mixed information about a target person
and this information is evaluatively extreme.
However, if individuals used only this risk-avoidance strategy
to cope with their social environment, their well-being in inter-
personal relations would be in jeopardy. Although this strategy
protects against potential danger, it narrows the number of
partners in social interactions, for it blocks the initiation and
development of new relationships. After all, because most peo-
ple we meet have positive as well as negative qualities, most of
them would be rejected if risk avoidance were the only goal.
Thus, to maintain or expand one's contacts with other people,
one sometimes has to evaluate others positively and to approach
them despite their occasional undesirable actions. This some-
what risky strategy is most reasonable if the expected negative
consequences are mild rather than severe, as mild discomforts
are easier to endure, to reverse, or to compensate by possible
benefits. Thus, we expect a positivity bias if moderately positive
and moderately negative information about the same target
person is available.
Some indirect support for our argument stems from decision
research showing that the smaller the gains and losses, the more
likely the choice of a risky decision strategy. In contrast, people
are more likely to choose the risk-avoidance strategy if the con-
sequences are more serious (Coombs & Avrunin, 1977;Slovic&
Lichtenstein, 1968; Zaleska, 1976). More direct support comes
from a study that reveals a positivity effect if a fictitious target
has a moderately positive and a moderately negative trait, but a
negativity effect if the target has an extremely positive as well as
an extremely negative trait (Czapinski, 1982). The problem
with Czapinski's study, however, is that it manipulated the evalu-
ative extremity of positive and negative adjectives only, whereas
their descriptive content varied widely. Thus, the morality-
competence distinction was not investigated.
Present Study
To ascertain the effects of content and evaluative extremity,
we manipulated them independently in the present experi-
ment. Specifically, subjects were informed about two positive
and two negative behaviors of a fictitious person, with all behav-
iors referring to the same trait pertaining either to morality or
to competence. All four behaviors presented to the same subject
were of similar evaluative intensity, but this intensity varied
between subjects: Half of them responded to moderately evalu-
ated behaviors (low evaluative extremity), whereas the re-
mainder responded to extremely evaluated behaviors (high eval-
uative extremity). After reading the information about behav-
iors of a target person, subjects were asked to indicate their
impressions of that target.
Three hypotheses were tested. The asymmetrical diagnostic-
ity hypothesis holds that positive and negative information on
the same target results in positive impressions in the compe-
tence domain but in negative impressions in the morality do-
main. This hypothesis is consistent with Reeder's and with
Skowronski and Carlston's theory.
The second, evaluative extremity hypothesis holds that inte-
gration of moderately positive and negative information on the
same target yields positive impressions, whereas integration of
extremely positive and negative information yields negative im-
pressions. Admittedly, the reasoning behind this hypothesis ap-
plies mainly to situations in which the target's behavior has
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personal consequences for the perceiver. But subjects may gen-
eralize and use this decision strategy in situations in which the
actor's behavior does not affect them personally.
Our last, content plus evaluation hypothesis predicts what
happens if both factors, descriptive content and evaluative ex-
tremity, vary within the same set of stimulus materials. We
predict that the two factors work in an additive way, thus result-
ing in strong biases if they work in the same direction, but in
weak biases if they work in opposite directions. In particular, a
strong positivity bias is expected when the critical behaviors
refer to competence and are moderately evaluated, whereas a
strong negativity bias is expected when the behaviors refer to
morality and are extremely evaluated. Finally, for extremely
evaluative information referring to competence, and for moder-
ately evaluative information referring to morality, more neutral
impressions are expected.
These hypotheses were examined in relation to two depen-
dent measures: (a) specific trait inferences and (b) global evalua-
tions of the target person. Identical predictions were made for
both dependent variables because both are not pure measures
of descriptive or evaluative meaning. Rather, as most traits are
highly evaluative (N. H. Anderson, 1968), trait inferences gauge
descriptive as well as evaluative meaning of behavior. Corre-
spondingly, because interpersonal evaluations are frequently
based on specific trait or category-related inferences (Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990; Srull & Wyer, 1989), global evaluations reflect
evaluative as well as descriptive meaning. Note, however, that
virtually all studies showing or suggesting (through attribu-
tions) positivity effects used trait inferences (Reeder & Fulks,
1980; Reeder, Messick, & Van Avermaet, 1977; Skowronski &
Carlston, 1987), whereas studies that yielded negativity effects
have typically used global evaluations (e.g., N. H. Anderson,
1965; Fiske, 1980; Hodges, 1974; Simpson & Ostrom, 1976).
The question then is whether the two measures function in a
similar way, thus indicating that the positivity and negativity
biases in these two kinds of studies are comparable.
Finally, we asked our subjects to predict the targets' future
behaviors. This measure was of only minor importance in the
present study, but was included because some research in this
area has used behavioral predictions instead of trait inferences
or attributions to gauge negativity and positivity effects (e.g.,
Coovert & Reeder, 1990). Our intention was to explore whether
behavioral predictions indeed follow the pattern predicted for
trait inferences and global evaluations.
Method
Subjects and Design
Five groups of Polish university students (68 women and 40 men)
participated in this study. Half of the subjects were randomly assigned
to the high-evaluative-extremity condition, and half were assigned to
the low-evaluative-extremity condition. Each subject responded to six
target persons with male first names. Information about each of three
targets referred to one of three preselected moral traits (honest, loyal, or
just), whereas information about each of the three remaining targets
referred to one of three competence-related traits {intelligent, will
power, or courageous). We used a 2 X 2 factorial design with evaluative
extremity (high vs. low) as a between-subjects factor and content do-
main (moral vs. competence) as a within-subject factor.
Procedure
The study was introduced to the subjects as dealing with the way that
people form impressions of other persons on the basis of information
about those persons' typical behaviors. Subjects were told that differ-
ent descriptions of the same person stemmed from different people
who knew that person and had described him in a previous study. The
subjects were instructed to form a general impression of the target
from this multisource information.
Each target was described by two positive and two negative behav-
iors pertaining to the same trait dimension. The within-target order of
behaviors was random. After the self-paced reading of the four behav-
iors, subjects were asked to rate that target on several scales, each
printed on a separate page. Then subjects proceeded to the next target
and repeated the procedure.
Each subject judged three targets whose behavior pertained to one
of the three morality-related traits and another three targets whose
behavior pertained to one of the three competence-related traits. Every
sixth subject began with a different trait; the order of the remaining
five traits varied randomly.
Stimulus Materials
All behavior descriptions were taken from a list of 2,400 behaviors
described elsewhere (Wojciszke, Pienkowski, Maroszek, Brycz, & Ra-
tajczak, in press). The list consisted of behaviors that referred to 20
trait dimensions, in which 60 behaviors represented the positive pole of
the dimension (e.g., honesty) and 60 other behaviors represented the
negative pole of the same dimension (e.g., dishonesty). Two estimates
had been collected for each behavior: the extent that it pertained to the
trait in question (prototypicality) and its desirability (valence).
Prototypicality estimates were made by 66 pretest subjects. For the
trait honesty, for example, subjects answered the question "To what
extent is this behavior a typical example of honesty, that is, how much
could you say about a person's honesty based on this behavior alone?"
Subjects indicated their judgments on scales ranging from next to noth-
ing can be said (0) to very much can be said (6). These prototypicality
estimates conceptually resemble the diagnosticity measure used by
Skowronski and Carlston (1987). Accordingly, Wojciszke et al. (in
press) found that increasing the prototypicality of stimulus behaviors
resulted in a strong linear increase in extremity of traits inferred from
those behaviors. They also found that prototypicality estimates were
higher for negative than for positive behaviors among moral traits,
whereas the opposite was true among competence-related traits. High
correlations between the prototypicality estimates of behaviors and
trait inferences made on the basis of those behaviors have also been
found by Borkenau (1990) and by Read, Jones, and Miller (1990), for
different sets of traits and behaviors.
The second estimate referred to the valence of the behaviors. For
each behavior, the same group of 66 subjects responded to the question
"Based on this behavior alone, what would be your evaluation of the
person who performed such a behavior?" Subjects responded on a
scale from very negative (-3) to neutral (0) and very positive (+3).
The prototypicality estimates were used to balance the appropriate
stimulus behaviors for the extent that they referred to the positive or
negative pole of the relevant trait dimension. The valence estimates
were used to manipulate evaluative extremity and to balance positive
and negative behaviors (referring to the same trait or target) for their
evaluative extremity. The behavior descriptions used in this study are
listed in the Appendix.
Manipulations
Morality-competence distinction. The selection of traits represent-
ing the two content domains was based on a pilot study in which the 20
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dimensions of the Wojciszke et al. (in press) list were mixed with 30
other trait dimensions and then rated for the extent that they involved
morality (by 34 subjects) or skills and abilities (by another 40 subjects).
Both judgments were made on scales ranging from 0 to 6. Honest,
loyal, and just were selected to represent the morality domain, and
intelligent, will power, and courageous were selected to represent the
competence domain. The average morality ratings of the six traits were
5.65, 4.53, 5.41, 2.06, 3.27, and 2.97, respectively, whereas the average
competence ratings were 2.18, 2.30, 3.08, 5.15, 4.63, and 3.53.
Evaluative extremity manipulation. On the basis of the valence esti-
mates, a set of two moderately positive and two moderately negative
behaviors as well as another set of two extremely positive and two
extremely negative behaviors was selected for each trait dimension. All
moderate sets (each of them referring to a different trait dimension)
constituted the behavior descriptions presented to subjects in the low-
evaluative-extremity condition. All extreme sets constituted the de-
scriptions given to subjects in the high-evaluative-extremity condition.
The overall means of the valence estimates of moderately positive
and negative behaviors were 0.76 and -0.76, respectively, whereas the
mean valences of strongly positive and negative behaviors were 2.35
and -2.31. No estimate of a single behavior deviated more than 0.20
from the appropriate mean (on a scale ranging from - 3 to 3). Positive
and negative behaviors were thus balanced in evaluative extremity.
Within the individual target descriptions, the two positive and two
negative behaviors were also balanced in their relatedness to the re-
spective traits. Specifically, the difference between the prototypicality
of positive and negative behaviors of the same target was 0.23 on the
average (and varied across the targets from 0.05 to 0.66). However, the
differences in valence were confounded with the differences in proto-
typicality. Specifically, the moderately evaluated behaviors were also
lower in prototypicality (2.67 and 2.78 for positive and negative traits),
whereas the extremely evaluated behaviors were also higher in proto-
typicality (4.64 and 4.63, respectively).
Although confounding of valence and prototypicality of stimulus
behaviors may seem undesirable, it is almost inevitable: We had as
many as 120 descriptions of behaviors pertaining to each trait dimen-
sion, yet it was virtually impossible to find acts that were highly proto-
typical for the positive pole of a dimension and only slightly positive in
valence. The same was true of negatively evaluated acts. It may be
possible to create such items, but for three reasons we did not.
First, because such items were not found among hundreds of behav-
iors generated by two hundred subjects (and then rated by more than
one thousand other subjects in the study by Wojciszke et al., in press),
they are probably unrepresentative of the way in which people think
about moral and competence-related traits. Indeed, we have found
substantial within-trait correlations between the prototypicality and
valence of behaviors. These correlations were especially strong (about
.70) for traits pertaining either to morality or competence, whereas for
traits referring to neither of these domains the correlations were lower
(sometimes 0). In other words, the relation between prototypicality
and valence was particularly strong for the traits studied in the present
experiment. We therefore decided to represent this relation in our stim-
ulus material.
Second, the 2.67 and 2.78 mean prototypicalities in the low extrem-
ity condition are far from 0. Wojciszke et al. (in press, Study 2) have
shown for 16 traits that such a prototypicality level of stimulus behav-
iors leads to quite extreme inferences of relevant traits (4.45 on a scale
ranging from 1 to 7), that is, inferences that are only one scale point
lower than the average inferences (5.43) from behaviors of the same
prototypicality level as those used in the present high-extremity condi-
tion. Stated differently, behaviors such as those used in our low-extrem-
ity condition instigate clear inferences of the relevant traits, which are
not much weaker than inferences from behaviors used in our high
extremity condition.
Third, a logical way in which the prototypicality-valence confound
should influence our results is to attenuate the effects of the informa-
tion content in the low-extremity conditions (due to possible weak trait
inferences drawn from behaviors relatively low in prototypicality).
This would work against our third, description plus evaluation hy-
pothesis.
Dependent Variables
Having read all descriptions pertaining to the same target, subjects
made a trait inference on a scale ranging from -5 (e.g., dishonest) to 5
(e.g., honest), and they evaluated the target on a scale from dislikable
(-5) to likable (+5). The order of the two scales was varied but had no
effect on the results. Hence order of presentation is ignored in the
further analyses.
Finally, all subjects were given two behavior descriptions (similar to
those that are reported in the Appendix), both of them positive and
referring to the trait at issue. They were asked to predict on a scale from
very improbable (-5) to very probable (5) whether the target was likely to
show this behavior. Predictions of the two behaviors were averaged,
yielding an index of behavior prediction.
Results
The results were analyzed in two ways. First, separate 2 x 2
analyses of variance were performed on trait inferences, global
evaluations, and behavior predictions, with evaluative extrem-
ity as a between-subjects factor and the content domain as a
within-subject factor repeated for three traits and targets on
both levels. Second, we compared the successive cell means (as
well as the row and column means from Table 1) with the neu-
tral scale values (0) by means of t tests to check whether a
positivity or negativity bias occurred in absolute terms.
Table 1
Positivity and Negativity Bias in Trait Inferences, Global
Evaluations, and Behavior Predictions as a Function of the

































Note. The neutral value is 0.00 for all measures.
*/><.05. **p<.0\. ***/>< .001.
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Asymmetrical Diagnosticity Hypothesis
This hypothesis predicted that trait inferences and global
evaluations should be generally more positive in the ability than
in the morality domain. The analysis of trait inferences re-
vealed the expected main effect of the domain, F(\, 106) =
24.53, p < .001, with trait inferences being more positive in the
competence (M= 0.67) than the morality (M= -0.34) domain.
As shown in Table 1, the former inferences were generally posi-
tive and the latter negative (significantly above and below 0).
This pattern also held at the level of individual traits: intelli-
gent, will power, and courageous yielded positive trait infer-
ences (0.97, 0.65, and 0.40, respectively), whereas just, honest,
and loyal yielded negative ones (-0.54, -0.12, and -0.40). For
all traits but honesty, the means were different from the neutral
value 0.00 at p<. 05.
The analysis of global evaluations revealed a similar main
effect of the content domain, F(l, 106) = 84.59, p < .001. Evalua-
tions were generally higher and positive in the competence do-
main (M = 0.97), but lower and negative in the morality do-
main (M = -0.69). This pattern was also identified at the level
of individual traits: Intelligent, will power, and courageous
yielded positive evaluations (0.84,1.30, and 0.75), whereas just,
honest, and loyal yielded negative ones (-0.47, -0.09, and
— 1.53). For all traits but honesty, these means were different
from the neutral value 0.00 at p < .05.
These results are clearly consistent with the asymmetrical
diagnosticity hypothesis, that is, Reeder and Brewer's (1979)
and Skowronski and Carlston's (1987) theories. Moreover, they
replicate the findings by Skowronski and Carlston (1987, Ex-
periment 2) not only for the trait inference measure (used origi-
nally by these authors) but also for the global evaluation mea-
sure.
Evaluative Extremity Hypothesis
This hypothesis predicted that trait inferences and evalua-
tions should be more positive if the integrated information was
evaluatively moderate as opposed to extreme. The analysis of
trait inferences revealed the expected main effect of evaluative
extremity, F(l, 106) = 9.58, p < .003. Moderately evaluative
information led to more positive trait inferences (M = 0.63)
than extremely evaluative information {M= —0.32). Moreover,
the former inferences were significantly above 0, whereas the
latter were significantly below 0 (see Table 1). The difference
between the low- and high-extremity conditions was also ob-
served at the level of single traits: intelligent (1.32 vs. 0.61, p <
.05), will power (1.02 vs. 0.28, p < .03), courageous (0.69 vs.
0.10, p < .07), just (0.38 vs. -1.46, p < .001), honest (0.56 vs.
-0.79, p < .005), and loyal (-0.22 vs. -0.57, ns).
The analysis of global evaluations yielded similar results.
Global evaluations of the target person were higher when infor-
mation about the target involved moderately (M= 0.64) rather
than extremely evaluated {M = -0.38) behaviors, F(l, 106) =
18.00, p < .0001. As shown in Table 1, the former evaluations
were also positive, whereas the latter were negative in absolute
terms. The difference between the low- and high-extremity
conditions held also for individual traits: intelligent (0.98 vs.
0.70, ns), will power (1.83 vs. 0.76, p < .01), courageous (1.30 vs.
0.20, p < .02), just (0.33 vs. -1.26, p < .001), honest (0.33 vs.
-0.80, p < .002), and loyal (-1.22 vs. -1.83, ns).
These results support the evaluative extremity hypothesis for
both dependent variables: The higher the evaluative extremity
of integrated information, the more negative the relevant trait
inferences and the global evaluation of the target person.
Content Plus Evaluation Hypothesis
The interaction between content domain and evaluative ex-
tremity was nonsignificant for both the trait ratings and the
likability ratings, Fs < 1. As can be seen in Table 1, the additive
effects of content and evaluative extremity produced an interest-
ing pattern of cell means.
As expected, marked and significant negative cell means
were only obtained in the morality high-extremity condition.
Moreover, the only consistently positive cell means were found
in the competence low-extremity condition. In the remaining
two conditions (morality low extremity and competence high
extremity), trait inferences and evaluations did not deviate sig-
nificantly from 0.00, with the exception of evaluations in the
competence high extremity condition, in which a weak positiv-
ity effect was found. As can be seen from the means reported in
the previous section, this pattern held also for most of the indi-
vidual traits.
These results tell a simple story. If asymmetrical diagnostic-
ity and evaluative extremity of the integrated information both
favor positive impressions, a clear positivity bias emerges. In
contrast, if both these influences favor negative impressions, a
clear negativity bias is found. However, if the content of inte-
grated information invites negativity, whereas its low evaluative
extremity invites positivity (or vice versa), the two influences
cancel out and the impressions tend to be neutral. Thus, the
content plus evaluation hypothesis assuming additivity of the
two factors was also confirmed.
Behavior Predictions
The analysis of behavior predictions revealed neither the
content domain nor the evaluative extremity main effect, F< 1
and F(l, 106) = 2.58, ns, respectively. As can be seen in the
lowest panel of Table 1, subjects' predictions were invariably
and significantly positive in all conditions. Predictions were
also generally overly optimistic in comparison with what was
justified by pure input information on target persons. This
may reflect the influence of base rates, that is, the general ex-
pectation that people behave in a positive rather than a negative
way (e.g., Matlin & Stang, 1978). It seems then that when mak-
ing predictions, subjects consider not only the input informa-
tion at hand but also their general expectations concerning
others' behavior.1
1 These data suggest also that using behavior predictions rather than
direct trait inferences or attributions (e.g., Coovert & Reeder, 1990,
Experiment 2) may not be an advisable procedure for gauging positiv-
ity-negativity biases, at least in conditions in which only a small
amount of information about target persons is available to subjects.
However, the influence of generally positive expectations on predic-
tions of concrete behaviors is probably less pronounced if perceivers
have more information about the specific target persons (Krueger &
Rothbart, 1988; Locksley, Hepburn, & Ortiz, 1982).
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Discussion
The present research suggests that the evaluative extremity of
behavioral information plays an important role in information
integration: Extremely evaluative information results in negativ-
ity effects, whereas moderately evaluative information results in
positivity effects.2
Moreover, the present results show not only the usual negativ-
ity effect for morality-related information, but also the very rare
positivity effect for competence-related information. The latter
has been shown only by Skowronski and Carlston (1987) for
inferences of intelligence and by Czapinski (1982) for global
evaluations based on personality-descriptive adjectives varying
widely in content.
Although we are not aware of any other studies that manipu-
lated both the diagnosticity and evaluative extremity of the in-
formation, we found two experiments in which subjects inte-
grated discrepant behavioral descriptions concerning morality
that were either extreme or moderate (Birnbaum, 1973, Figure
1, panel A; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, Experiment 2). In
both these studies, the negativity effect was strong and reliable
for extreme behaviors, but weak or nonexistent for moderate
behaviors. Thus, the results of these studies are consistent with
our findings concerning morality.
In contrast, our findings differ from Skowronski and Carl-
ston's (1987) for the competence domain. We found that the
positivity effect decreases with behavior extremity, whereas
Skowronski and Carlston (1987) found that the positivity effect
increases with behavior extremity. But there is an important
difference between their study and ours concerning the content
of the extremely incompetent behaviors. We selected negative
behaviors that indicated low ability and instigated extremely
negative evaluations, whereas Skowronski and Carlston's (1987)
low-ability behaviors indicated lack of competence only. In ef-
fect, many of our low-ability behaviors were dangerous or
frightening (see Appendix), whereas in Skowronski and Carl-
ston's (1987) study, only one of the five extremely incompetent
behaviors was really dangerous (drinking and driving). The
other four were quite innocuous (e.g., "Can't remember how to
tie his own shoelaces").
This suggests that the actual pattern of morality-compe-
tence differences in impression formation may be more com-
plicated than suggested by the purely diagnosticity-based con-
siderations of Reeder and Brewer (1979) and Skowronski and
Carlston (1989): The evaluative extremity of the integrated in-
formation may also be important.
Relation Between Extremity and Diagnosticity
At first glance, the present extension of diagnosticity-based
models may be understood in one of two ways. First, evaluative
extremity may be seen as a factor influencing the diagnosticity
of integrated information: The more extreme the behavior, the
higher its diagnosticity for the trait at issue. Alternatively, evalu-
ative extremity may be seen as influencing information integra-
tion independently of behavior diagnosticity. On the basis of
the obtained pattern of results, we favor the second view. If
evaluative extremity had affected information integration
through information diagnosticity, the diagnosticity-based
asymmetries in both the morality and the competence domains
should have been more pronounced in the high-extremity con-
dition than in the low-extremity condition. This would imply a
Content X Extremity interaction that was not found. Rather,
the difference between the two domains remained quite stable
across both extremity levels (see Table 1), implying that the
influence of evaluative extremity on integration biases is not
mediated by behavior diagnosticity.
As noted earlier, Wojciszke et al. (in press) found a strong
correlation between behavior prototypicality (a measure simi-
lar to diagnosticity) and its evaluative extremity. This correla-
tion indicates a substantial confound of the two behavior pa-
rameters in the present study: In the high-extremity condition,
the stimulus behaviors were higher both in valence and prototy-
picality, raising the question which of them produced the dif-
ferences between the high- and low-extremity condition.
The lack of a Content X Extremity interaction helps to clarify
this issue as well. If the difference between the two condi-
tions reflected the higher diagnosticity of stimulus behaviors
in the high-extremity condition, both diagnosticity-based
biases—negativity in the morality domain and positivity in the
competence domain—should have been stronger in the high-
extremity condition. In the competence domain, however, a
reverse relation was obtained: The positivity bias was weaker in
the high-extremity condition than in the low-extremity condi-
tion. This result suggests that the effects of behavior extremity
reflect differences among stimulus behaviors in evaluative ex-
tremity rather than in diagnosticity (prototypicality).
Generally speaking, our findings do not imply that evaluative
extremity is a stronger predictor of integration biases than the
content of the information, or vice versa. Because the levels at
which we manipulated both factors were arbitrary, the present
experiment cannot tell us which of them is more important.
Moreover, because we used prototypicality ratings as an indi-
rect measure of diagnosticity, the present results should be in-
terpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, it seems that integration
biases can be predicted more precisely if, in addition to the
descriptive content of the information, its evaluative extremity
is taken into account.
Trait Inferences and Observers' Goals
The present experiment raises the issue of how to explain the
impact of information content and evaluative extremity within
a common theoretical framework. The cue-diagnosticity
model of impression formation proposed by Skowronski and
Carlston (1987,1989) does not provide such a framework. Ac-
cording to this model, trait inferences are categorization pro-
cesses in which people use an actor's behavior to assign this
actor to one or more trait categories. Some behaviors offer more
diagnostic cues for specific trait inferences than others, and the
more diagnostic a cue, the higher the probability that the actor
2 This finding suggests an explanation for why negativity effects are
reported more frequently than positivity effects in the information
integration literature. In looking for strong and reliable manipulations,
researchers often provide information to their subjects that is ex-
tremely positive or extremely negative. This tendency, however, pro-
duces a reliable negativity effect in information integration.
POSITIVITY AND NEGATIVITY BIASES 333
who performs this behavior is assigned to that trait category.
This model is obviously at variance with the results of the pres-
ent study, which indicate that there is more to trait inferences
than diagnosticity alone.
But if diagnosticity models account for only part of the find-
ings, what might a common theoretical framework look like?
We would like to suggest that both main effects in the present
study, that of content and that of extremity, reflect the goals and
interests of perceivers. First consider the effects of content. Per-
ceivers are usually less affected by lack of competence of others
than by their immoral behavior. If others are competent, they
can help the perceivers or be asked for advice. If they are not
competent, this does not affect the perceivers' interests, be-
cause they can usually turn to someone else. Competent behav-
ior may therefore be weighted more strongly than incompetent
behavior. In contrast, perceivers are more affected by the im-
moral than by the moral behavior of other persons because
immoral behaviors may threaten perceivers' well-being, prop-
erty, or even their lives, without giving them the chance to avoid
or to escape the perpetrator. This may be the reason why im-
moral behavior is weighted more strongly than moral behavior
in information integration.
Obviously, the main effect of content may also be explained
in terms of diagnosticity (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski
& Carlston, 1987). But diagnosticity explanations cannot ex-
plain the main effect of behavior extremity, whereas the goals
and interests of the perceiver can explain both main effects.
From the perspective of the perceiver, the main effect of behav-
ior extremity may reflect a risk-seeking strategy in the case of
moderate benefits and losses and a risk-avoidance strategy in
the case of extreme benefits and losses. This presupposes that
the positive or negative evaluation of another person is under-
stood as a signal to approach or to avoid that person.
An important implication of this theorizing about positivity
and negativity biases in terms of approach and avoidance ten-
dencies is that it is at variance with a mechanistic view of infor-
mation integration as suggested, for example, by N. H. Ander-
son (1981). This author claimed that we form impressions of
other persons very much like a computer that counts and aver-
ages bits of information. But the computer analogy of human
information integration neglects that the human mind was not
designed as a general-purpose information processor, but is
rather a biologically based system that was shaped by natural
selection to successfully solve various discrete adaptive prob-
lems. The way that we process information may therefore be
the outcome of small and specific adaptations to environmen-
tal pressures in the human evolutionary past (Cosmides, 1989;
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989).
Obviously, it's currently impossible to test or even to prove
such evolutionary arguments. But what may be done is to derive
and to test predictions that follow from a functional view on
human information processing (J. R. Anderson, 1991). Con-
cerning the evaluation of other persons, this implies that sub-
jects tend to evaluate others positively who are likely to be bene-
ficial for theih and to evaluate others negatively who are likely
to be detrimental to them. For example, in addition to the
content and extremity effects that were found in the present
study, context effects are expected as well. The positivity effect
for competence information should be less pronounced if the
perceiver is bound to cooperate with the actor, because occa-
sional incompetent behaviors by a partner imply a lower proba-
bility of common success. Second, if moral information and
competence information refer to the same actor, a Morality X
Competence interaction should be found: Although compe-
tence as well as morality are favorable attributes, an immoral
and competent person should be perceived as more dangerous
and therefore as equally negative or even more negative, than an
immoral and incompetent person. Thus, the functional view
suggests several predictions that differ from those that follow
from a mechanistic view.
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Appendix
Behavioral Descriptions Used in Two Evaluation Conditions
Behavioral Descriptions Used in the
Strong Evaluation Condition
Honest
Having noticed that a shop assistant gave him too much
change, Paul returned the surplus.
Paul paid back a loan to an acquaintance who had already
forgotten about lending the money.
Dishonest
Paul caused an accident and ran away.
Paul told a little girl unfavorable things about her father.
Loyal
When the boss erroneously gave Mark the credit for a col-
league's idea, Mark clarified the mistake immediately.
Despite considerable pressure, Mark refused to reveal an-
other's secret.
Disloyal
Mark peached on a co-worker for egoistic reasons.
After his divorce, Mark refused to meet his children.
Just
Richard evaluated his co-workers on the basis of their com-
petence, disregarding his personal likings.
After discovering that he had been wrong, Richard apolo-
gized to a neighbor for an argument.
Unjust
Richard blamed his wife and his children for his own fail-
ures.
Richard punished his child for shouting with fear in the
night, although he himself had taken her to a disturbing movie.
Intelligent
John easily found a solution to a difficult problem.
John quickly learned some material and remembered it for a
long time.
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Lack of Intelligence
In the presence of visitors, John ridiculed his children for
their hobbies.
John drank alcohol while taking medicine.
Will Power
After having decided to earn a good grade on an exam, Adam
studied 6 hours a day for a long period.
Knowing that he would not benefit from an argument,
Adam refrained from quarreling.
Lack of Will Power
Although Adam had decided to visit his mother, his friends
persuaded him to go to the cinema.
Adam drank an excessive quantity of alcohol.
Courageous
Peter admitted a mistake without any fear of losing face.
Peter stood up for a person who was ridiculed by others.
Timid
Peter did not leave an ideological organization although he
did not believe in the cause.
Seeing a man lying on a sidewalk, Peter was so scared that he
ran away immediately.
Behavioral Descriptions Used in the
Weak Evaluation Condition
Honest
Paul told the examiner that he did not know the answer to a
question on the exam.
Paul persuaded his friend not to cross the street when the
lights are red.
Dishonest
Paul intensely discussed a book that he had not read.
Paul pushed himself to the head of a long queue.
Loyal
After a vote, Mark yielded to the majority although he had
favored another decision.
When he met an old school friend, Mark refused to have
coffee with him because he had promised his wife to go shop-
ping with her.
Disloyal
Mark informed a friend of another friend's unflattering
opinion.
When others stood in a long queue, Mark made a reservation
and waited in a coffee shop until his turn.
Just
After discovering that he had forgotten an important job,
Richard worked a whole night to finish it in time.
Richard did not blame the meterologists for his rain-spoiled
holidays although they had forecasted sunny weather for this
period.
Unjust
Richard spread a negative opinion about a doctor who had
misdiagnosed his appendicitis.
When pouring out wine, Richard gave himself more than he
gave the others.
Intelligent
John refused to accept a task that he was not able to carry out.
Lack of Intelligence
After a long time for reflection, John made the worst deci-
sion.
Because John did not understand his boss's motives, he
couldn't predict his behavior.
Will Power
Adam persuaded his friends to accept his proposal of where
to go on vacation.
Adam refused to do someone a favor because he considered
the request unjustified.
Lack of Will Power
Despite having much work, Adam was not able to get rid of a
talkative neighbor.
Only immediately before the exam, Adam started to study
seriously.
Courageous
When he couldn't unlock his door, Peter climbed to his flat
across his neighbor's balcony.
Peter picked up hitchhikers during a nighttime car ride.
Timid
Peter refrained from talking in front of a large audience.
During an exam, Peter felt that his head was completely
empty.
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